On Approximate Welfare- and Revenue-Maximizing Equilibria for
  Size-Interchangeable Bidders by Viqueira, Enrique Areyan et al.
On Approximate Welfare- and Revenue-Maximizing
Equilibria for Size-Interchangeable Bidders
ENRIQUE AREYAN VIQUEIRA, Brown Univeristy
AMY GREENWALD, Brown Univeristy
VICTOR NARODITSKIY
In a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), all bidders are envy-free (EF), meaning that their allocation maximizes
their utility; and the market clears (MC), meaning that the price of unallocated goods is zero. EF is desirable
to ensure the long-term viability of the market. MC ensures that demand meets supply.
Any allocation that is part of a WE is also welfare-maximizing; however, it need not be revenue-maximizing.
Furthermore, WE need not exist, e.g., in markets where bidders have combinatorial valuations. e traditional
approach to simultaneously addressing both existence and low revenue is to relax the MC condition and
instead require the price of unallocated goods be some, positive reserve price. e resulting solution concept,
known as Envy-Free Pricing (EFP), has been studied in some special cases, e.g., single-minded bidders.
In this paper, we go one step further; we relax EF as well as MC. We propose a relaxation of the EF condition
where only winners are envy-free, and further relax the MC condition so that unallocated goods are priced at
least at the reserve. We call this new solution concept Restricted Envy-Free Pricing (REFP). We investigate
what REFP entails for single-minded bidders, and show that for size-interchangeable bidders (a generalization
of single-minded introduced in this paper) we can compute a REFP in polynomial time, given a xed allocation.
As in the study of EFP, we remain interested in maximizing seller revenue. Instead of computing an outcome
that simultaneously yields an allocation and corresponding prices, one could rst solve for an allocation that
respects a reserve price, and then solve for a corresponding set of supporting prices, each one at least the
reserve. is two-step process fails in the case of EFP since, given a xed allocation, envy-free prices need not
exist. However, restricted envy-free prices always exist. We derive necessary and sucient conditions for
nding them in the case of size-interchangeable bidders. Ours is a linear characterization and thus, coupled
with natural greedy approximation algorithms for nding allocations, we propose ecient computational
methods to nd REFP, which we then use within a heuristic to nd seller-revenue maximizing REFP outcomes.
We provide theoretical bounds for our algorithms where possible, and run extensive experiments to evaluate
their performance in practice. Compared to other benchmarks in the literature, they perform well on the
metrics of revenue and eciency, without incurring too many violations of the true WE conditions.
1 INTRODUCTION
In a centralized combinatorial matching market (CCMM) [Cramton et al., 2006, De Vries
and Vohra, 2003], a market maker oers a set U of n heterogeneous goods to m consumers (or
bidders), the laer of which are interested in acquiring combinations (or bundles) of goods. In
general, there are multiple copies of each good i , but the total supply of each good is nite. Bidder
j’s preferences are captured by a valuation function that describes how j values each bundle.
In general, a bidder’s valuation function can be an arbitrary function of the set of all bundles.
CCMMs are a fundamental market model with many practical applications a few of which are:
estate auctions, transportation networks, wireless spectrum allocation and electronic advertising
markets; and thus, these markets have been extensively studied in the literature [Anshelevich et al.,
2015, Babaio et al., 2009, Guruswami et al., 2005, Monaco et al., 2015, Nisan et al., 2007].
Given a CCMM, a market outcome is an allocation-pricing pair (X ,p), where X describes an
allocation of goods to bidders, and p ascribes prices to goods. While X is a matrix, in our model we
assume that p is a vector, which precludes any form of price discrimination (all copies of the same
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good must have the same price). Furthermore, we assume item pricing, not bundle pricing, so
that the price of a bundle is the sum of the prices of all the goods (items) in the bundle. Both of
these assumptions—no price discrimination and item pricing—are most natural. Given a market
outcome, we assume quasi-linear utilitites, meaning bidder j’s utility is dened to be the dierence
between their valuation for the bundle they are allocated, and its price.
In a CCMM, of paramount concern is what properties are desirable in an outcome. In this paper,
we focus on a fundamental market outcome known as Walrasian equilibrium (WE) [Walras,
2003]. An outcome is said to be a WE if two properties hold: (1) all bidders are envy-free (EF),
meaning the outcome is utility-maximizing for all, and (2) the market clears (MC), meaning the
price of any unallocated good is zero. A WE is a fundamental market outcome that ensures that
market participants are maximally happy with the outcome while at the same time supply meets
demand. Moreover, by the rst welfare theorem of economics, any allocation that is part of a WE
is also maximizes (social) welfare (i.e., the total utility of the bidders and the market maker).
While of great theoretical importance, the WE concept suers from two important drawbacks.
First, a WE might not exist, even for relatively simple forms of bidders’ valuation functions (see
Section 2, for an example). Second, even when one does exist, the revenue of a WE outcome can
be low, in particular as low as zero. Revenue in this context is dened as the total income of the
market maker, i.e. ∑i, j xi jpi .
A well-known approach to simultaneously address both existence and low revenue is to relax
only the MC condition, and instead require that the price of unallocated goods is some, possibly
non-zero, reserve price. is approach is known as Envy-Free Pricing (EFP) [Braˆnzei et al., 2016,
Feldman et al., 2012, Guruswami et al., 2005] and has been extensively studied in the case of
single-minded bidders (see, for example [Cheung and Swamy, 2008, Guruswami et al., 2005]). is
is not the only approach to relaxing a WE that has been proposed. For example, to address the
existence issue, Postlewaite and Schmeidler [Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1981] dene an ϵ-WE in
which every bidder is envy-free up to a ratio of 1-ϵ , and Huang, Li, and Zhang [Huang et al., 2005]
try to maximize the ratio of envy-free bidders to all bidders. Note that in all of these approaches,
one only relaxes either the EF or the MC condition.
In this paper, we go one step further and relax both the EF and MC conditions. We propose a
relaxation of the EF condition where only winners (bidders that are part of the allocation) are EF,
and further relax the MC condition such that unallocated goods are priced at least at the reserve. We
call this new solution concept Restricted Envy-Free Pricing (REFP). We investigate what REFP entails
for single-minded bidders, and show that for size-interchangeable bidders (a generalization of the
single-minded case we introduce in this paper) we can compute REFP in polynomial time, given a
xed allocation. In the case of single-minded bidders, there exist polynomial-time algorithms to
nd nearly welfare-maximizing allocations [Lehmann et al., 2002]. We extend these algorithms to
size-interchangeable, and use them to compute REFP outcomes.
As in the case of EFP, we remain interested in computing outcomes with maximal revenue.
Drawing inspiration from algorithms proposed for EFP in the case of unit-demand and single-
minded bidders, we propose and evaluate algorithms to nd revenue-maximizing REFP in the case
of size-interchangeable bidders. ese algorithms work by exploring a space of reserve prices: for
each candidate reserve price, they nd an EFP, and then, among all outcomes seen, they choose
one with maximal revenue.
Alternatively, given a candidate reserve price, one could have instead solved for an allocation
that respects the reserve price and then solved for a corresponding set of supporting prices, each
one being at least the reserve. is two-step process (rst solve for an allocation and then for
prices) fails in the case of EFP since, given an allocation, envy-free prices might not exist. However,
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restricted envy-free prices always exist. is begs the question: given an allocation, are these prices
eciently computable?
In this paper, we answer this question in the armative for two special cases: single-minded
bidders and size-interchangeable bidders. In the case of single-minded bidders, we show that
nding a set of revenue-maximizing REFP reduces to the problem of nding a welfare-maximizing
allocation. In the more complicated case of size-interchangeable bidders, we derive necessary and
sucient conditions for nding restricted envy-free prices, given a xed allocation, and propose a
greedy heuristic to nd approximately welfare-maximizing allocations. Our characterization of
restricted envy-free prices is a linear characterization and thus, together with our greedy heuristic,
we succeed in nding REFP for size-interchangeable bidders in polynomial-time.
Our linear characterization is agnostic as to the objective function being optimized. us, we
present a powerful two-step framework where we rst solve for an allocation, and then for restricted
envy-free prices for any linear objective function of the prices. We then apply this methodology to
solve, in particular, for revenue-maximizing REFP for a xed allocation and reserve price, and use
this algorithm at the heart of a heuristic to nd revenue maximizing REFP among all allocations
and reserve prices. We evaluate the performance of our revenue-maximizing heuristic by running
extensive experiments, using both synthetic and real-world data and by feeding it allocations
obtained with two dierent objectives: (1) egalitarian, which maximizes the number of winners,
and (2) welfare-maximizing, which maximizes total utility.
Our size-interchangeable model is motivated by the Trading Agent Competition Ad Exchange
game (TAC AdX) [Schain and Mansour, 2013], which in turn models online ad exchanges in which
agents face the challenge of bidding for display-ad impressions needed to fulll advertisement
contracts, aer which they earn the amount the advertiser budgeted. Other seings captured by this
model include the problem of how to allocate specialized workers to rms, and how to compensate
the workers, where each rm requires a certain number of workers to produce an output (a new
technology, for instance) that yields a certain revenue.
e paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents some preliminaries and our formal model,
with examples. Section 3 presents methods for computing REFP in the case of single-minded and size-
interchangeable bidders. Section 4 builds on the methods of Section 3 to derive a polynomial-time
heuristic to nd revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes. Section 5 presents results in the of singleton
and single-minded CCMMs. Section 6 presents experiments where we evaluate the performance of
our algorithms. Finally, we conclude and discuss possible future research directions.
2 MODEL AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS
We dene a centralized combinatorial matching market (CCMM) (or market, for short) as
an augmented bipartite graph M = (U ,C,E, ~N ,~I , ~R), with a set of n types of goods U , a set of
m bidders C , a set of edges E from goods to bidders indicating which goods are of interest to
which bidders, a supply vector ~N = (N1, . . . ,Nn ), a demand vector ~I = (I1, . . . , Im ), and a reward
vector ~R = (R1, . . . ,Rm ). at is, there are Ni > 0 copies of good i ∈ U , and Ij > 0 total goods
are demanded by bidder j ∈ C , where this total is a sum across all types of goods i ∈ U such
that (i, j ) ∈ E. Reward R j > 0 is aained by j in case its demand Ij is fullled. We call bidders
whose valuations are characterized by acquiring bundles of goods of at least some xed size
size-interchangeable (SI).
Given a market M , an allocation is a labeling x (i, j ) ∈ Z≥0 of E that represents the number
of copies of good i allocated to bidder j. Such an allocation can be represented by a matrix
X ∈ Zn≥0 × Zm≥0, where entry xi j = x (i, j ). e jth column of an allocation matrix is the bundle of
goods assigned to bidder j, which we denote by X j ∈ B ( ~N ), where B ( ~N ) =∏i {0, 1, . . . ,Ni }.
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Having dened a market and an allocation, we now formally dene SI valuations.
Denition 2.1. (Size-interchangeable valuations). Given a market (U ,C,E, ~N ,~I , ~R), and an allo-
cation X , a bidder j’s valuation is size-interchangeable, if it demands Ij > 0 total goods among
those types to which it is connected, and values all such bundles by the function: Vj (X j ) = R j , if∑
i |(i, j )∈E xi j ≥ Ij , and 0 otherwise.
Our model (specically, these valuations), are motivated by Ad Exchanges—in particular, the Ad
Exchange Game [Schain and Mansour, 2013]—in which agents bid to fulll advertisers’ campaigns
c , each of which requires a xed number of impressions Ij from targeted web users u to obtain a
reward R j . Note also that SI valuations generalize single-minded bidders [Nisan et al., 2007], in
which bidders are interested only in one particular bundle of goods.
Example 2.2. (CCMM and possible outcomes). Consider the CCMM in Figure (A). ere are two
goods, G and F , with 2 copies of good G and 3 copies of good F , and two bidders, Y and Z . Bidder
Y wants two copies of good G (as indicated by the edge from G to Y ) and values this bundle at 10,
and bidder Z ascribes the value 5 to any bundle of size 2 comprised of any combination of Gs and
F s (also indicated by edges). Possible outcomes of this markets are depicted in Figures (B) and (C).
goods bidders
G2
F3
Y 2,$10
Z 2,$5
prices
2
2
G$5
F$1
Y
Z
prices
1
1
G$1
F$2
Y
Z
(A) (B) (C)
Outcome (B) allocates 2 copies of good G to bidder Y at a price of $5 per copy, and 2 copies of good
F to bidder Z at a price of $1 per copy. is outcome results in the optimal social welfare of $15
and a revenue of $12.
Outcome (C) allocates to bidder Z only, 1 copy of good G at a price of $1, and 1 copy of good F
at a price of $2. is outcome results in a social welfare of $5 and a revenue of $3.
A market outcome is an allocation-pricing pair (X ,p), assigning goods to bidders and per-
good prices pi ∈ R+. Given such an outcome, the cost of bundle X j to bidder j is given by
Pj (X j ) =
∑
i xi jpi , and the utility of bidder j is uj (X ,p) = Vj (X j ) − Pj (X j ).
An allocation is feasible if the total number of goods assigned across bidders is no more than
supply: i.e., for all i ∈ U : ∑mj=1 xi j ≤ Ni . We write F ≡ F (M ) to denote the set of all feasible
allocations. In a feasible outcome the allocation is feasible.
We refer to a bidder whose demand is fullled under allocation X as a winner, and denote by
W the set of all winners. e welfare of a feasible outcome is equal to the sum of the utilities of all
bidders and the market maker, which reduces to the sum of the rewards of all winners, i.e. ∑j ∈W R j .
A fundamental market outcome studied in the literature is that of Walrasian Equilibrium (WE)
[Walras, 2003], which we dene using our notation as follows.
Denition 2.3. A feasible outcome (X ,p) is a Walrasian Equilibrium (WE) if the following
two conditions hold:
(1) Envy-freeness (EF): ere is no bundle X ′j that any bidder j prefers to its assigned bundle
X j , i.e., for all j,X j ∈ arg max
X ′j ∈B ( ~N )
{Vj (X ′j ) − Pj (X ′j )}.
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(2) Market clearance (MC): Every unallocated good is priced at zero, i.e.,
∀i ∈ U : If m∑
j=1
xi j < Ni , then pi = 0.
e EF condition is a fairness condition; it ensures that the outcome maximizes the utility of every
bidder. Note that each bidder is individually rational i.e., uj (X ,p) ≥ 0, since the null allocation
is always a feasible allocation. e MC condition, together with EF, implies, by the rst welfare
theorem of economics, that any allocation that is part of a WE is also welfare-maximizing. However,
a WE need not exist in the markets studied in this paper.
Example 2.4. (Non-existence of WE) Consider the market in Figure (A) with one good and two
single-minded bidders. Good u1 is supplied in N1 = 2 copies, bidder c1 demands I1 = 1 good, and
bidder c2 demands I2 = 2 goods. Rewards are R1 = 5 and R2 = 7.
u12
c1 1,$5
c2 2,$7
2u12
c1 1,$5
c2 2,$7
1
u12
c1 1,$5
c2 2,$7
(A) (B) Not Envy-Free (C) Market doesn’t clear
ere are a total of 6 feasible allocations in this market and none of them are part of a Walrasian
Equilibrium. Two such allocations are depicted in (B) and (C). In (B), there is no price p1 for u1 at
which both bidders would be envy-free. In (C), we must have that p1 ≥ 3.5, or otherwise c2 would
have preferred 2 copies from u1. But then the market does not clear since there is an unsold copy
of u1 with price greater than 0.
To combat this diculty, researchers have proposed various ways of relaxing the WE conditions
to arrive at solution concepts with guaranteed existence. One such proposal is Envy-Free Pricing,
which we dene in our language as follows.
Denition 2.5. A feasible outcome (X ,p) is an Envy-Free Pricing (EFP) if EF holds.
Unlike a WE, an EFP always exists. An outcome in which no goods are allocated, and all are
priced at innity is a trivial, albeit undesirable, example of an EFP.
An EFP relaxes only the MC condition. We go one step further and relax both EF and MC
conditions to dene our new solution concept, Restricted-Envy-Free Pricing.
Denition 2.6. A feasible outcome (X ,p) is an Restricted-Envy-Free Pricing (REFP) if only
winners are envy-free.
Similar to an EFP, this solution concept always exists (same trivial example as before). However,
whereas for a xed allocation, an EFP might not exist, a REFP always exists, even if an allocation
has been decided upon beforehand. us, our solution concept provides a stronger guarantee of
existence and paves the way for fast computational methods to nd such outcomes.
3 POLYNOMIAL-TIME COMPUTATION OF REFP
In this section, we show how to eciently compute REFP in size-interchangeable CCMMs. Ours is
a two-step approach where we rst solve for an allocation; then, xing the allocation, we solve for
a set of supporting prices. We show that both of these steps can be done in polynomial time, and
thus, we derive a polynomial-time algorithm to nd REFP outcomes.
3.1 Finding Allocations
Although a REFP is not a WE, and hence the rst welfare theorem does not imply welfare maxi-
mization, approximate welfare maximization itself, to the extent it is achievable, remains desirable.
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ALGORITHM 1: Greedy approximation algorithm to nd allocations.
Input: Market M
Output: Allocation X
For all i, j set xi j = 0 // Start with the null allocation
foreach j ∈ C do
LetUj = {i | (i, j ) ∈ E and ∑mj=1 xi j < Ni } // Goods demanded by j still in supply
if
∑
i ∈Uj Ni ≥ Ij // Check that there are enough goods left for j to be satisfied
then
foreach i ∈ Uj do
xi j = min{Ij −∑ni=1 xi j ,Ni −∑mj=1 xi j } // Allocate copies of i to j until j’s demand
// is 0 or i’s supply is 0. Continue until demand is 0.
Furthermore, revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes, the subject of Section 4, will rely on allocations
that extract substantial value from bidders.
Denition 3.1. (Utilitarian) A utilitarian, or welfare-maximizing, allocation in a CCMM is a
solution to the following optimization problem:
maxX
m∑
j=1
R jyj , s.t.: ∀i :
m∑
j=1
xi j ≤ Ni ,∀j : yj ∈ {0, 1}.
Since size-interchangeable bidders generalize single-minded, nding a welfare-maximizing
allocation is NP-hard [Lehmann et al., 2002]. Consequently, it is unlikely that one can devise a
polynomial-time algorithm that maximizes welfare in size-interchangeable CCMMs.
We generalize Lehmann et. al’s greedy allocation scheme for single-minded bidders to size-
interchangeable bidders in Algorithm 1. ere are two sources of non-determinism in Algorithm 1:
(1) the order in which to loop through bidders and (2) the order in which to loop through goods.
e following theorem shows that ordering bidders in descending order of rewards per square
root of goods demanded, i.e., R j/
√
Ij , produces approximately optimal allocations, regardless of the
order in which goods are allocated. e approximation is linear in the number of bidders.
Theorem 3.2. e value of an allocation produced by the greedy approximation algorithm where
bids are ordered in ascending order of R j/
√
Ij is withinm
√
I ∗ of the value of a welfare-maximizing
allocation, wherem is the number of bidders and I ∗ = maxj ∈C Ij .
Proof. (Sketch) e proof follows the logic Lehmann et. al. eir key idea is to bound the
number of bidders that can be blocked by the greedy algorithm. A bidder j blocks a bidder k if by
allocating to j rst we cannot later allocate to k .
eir idea extends to SI valuations by noting that in the worst-case, a bidder j might block all
bidders, and all blocked bidders might demand I ∗ goods, so we obtain a weaker bound for the more
general case of size-interchangeable bidders. 
In the case where I ∗ = 1, this bound is tight. Consider a market with two bidders c1, c2, and two
types of goodsu1,u2, such that: R1 = R2 = 2; I1 = I2 = 1, and N1 = N2 = 1. Bidder c1 demands goods
of type u1 and u2, while bidder 2 only demands goods of type u2. e optimal allocation allocates 2
goods to each bidder, and yields welfare of 4. Algorithm 1 is indierent between allocating to c1
or c2 rst. Say c1 is allocated rst. If the goods allocated are of type u2, then bidder c2 cannot be
allocated, resulting in an allocation with welfare of only 2. In this case, the bound is tight since
2m
√
I ∗ = 4. It remains to investigate whether this bound is tight for values I ∗ > 1. Note that the
trivial algorithm that allocates all the goods to the bidder with the largest reward achieves a beer
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approximation guarantee ofm. We remain interested in other algorithms that allocate to multiple
bidders and thus, present eorem 3.2 as a rst step towards nding a tighter bound in the future.
We also present this theorem to illustrate the connection between the problem studied in this paper
and that of Lehmann et. al. [Lehmann et al., 2002]
Denition 3.3. (Egalitarian) An egalitarian allocation in a CCMM is a solution to the following
optimization problem: maxX
m∑
j=1
yj , s.t.: ∀i :
m∑
j=1
xi j ≤ Ni ,∀j : yj ∈ {0, 1}.
Corollary 3.4. Algorithm 1 can also be used to obtain an allocation that is withinm
√
I ∗ of the
optimal egalitarian allocation simply by ordering bidders by 1/
√
Ij .
3.2 Finding Restricted Envy-Free Prices, Given an Allocation
Given an allocation, we now turn to the question of nding restricted envy-free prices for said
allocation. Before presenting our algorithm, we formally dene restricted envy-free prices. Let
|X j | = ∑ni=1 xi j be the size of bidder j’s bundle, and let B ( ~N |X j | ) = {0} ∪ {X ′j ∈ B ( ~N ) | |X ′j | = |X j |}
to be the set of all feasible bundles of size |X j |.
Denition 3.5. (Restricted Envy-Free) A pricing p is called restricted envy-free with respect to
a feasible allocation X if, for all j such that |X j | > 0,
X j ∈ arg max
X ′j ∈B ( ~N |Xj | )
{Vj (X ′j ) − Pj (X ′j )}.
is denition is “restricted” because it assumes an allocation, and then is only concerned with
the envy-freeness of winners in that allocation: i.e., bidders that are allocated. Any envy felt by
any other bidders is simply ignored.
Another seeming restriction is that even for a bidder j with |X j | > 0, it does not require envy-
freeness with respect to all bundles X ′j ∈ B ( ~N ), but only with respect to bundles of the same size as
X j (i.e., X ′j ∈ B ( ~N |X j | )), and the empty bundle 0. As we are focused on bidders with single-valued,
size-interchangeable valuations, we are likewise concerned with all-or-none allocations, which
either allocate to a bidder in full, meaning a bundle of size Ij , or do not allocate at all. Hence, for
our purposes the size restriction is not restrictive at all.
Theorem 3.6. Given a marketM and a feasible allocationX , the following conditions are necessary
and sucient for p to be restricted envy-free.
Individual Rationality: ∀j ∈W : Pj (X j ) ≤ Vj (X j ).
Compact Condition: ∀i ∈ U , j ∈ C : If xi j > 0, then
∀k ∈ U : If (k, j ) ∈ E, and xk j < Nk then pi ≤ pk .
Proof. (Sketch) e Individual Rationality condition ensures that winners do not pay more than
their reward. e Compact Condition states that good types that are allocated in their entirety
to a single bidder can be priced more cheaply than those that are only partially allocated, but all
partially-allocated goods must be priced equally. It follows that the bundle assigned to a winner is
the cheapest among all available bundles. 
A detailed proof of this theorem is provided in the appendix.
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ALGORITHM 2: Linear program to nd restricted envy free prices.
Input: Market, allocation, and objective: (M,X , f )
Output: A pricing p
maximize f (M,X ,p)
subject to (1) ∀j ∈ C : If |X j | > 0, then Pj (X j ) ≤ Vj (X j )
(2) ∀i ∈ U ,∀j ∈ C : If xi j > 0 then ∀k ∈ U : If (k, j ) ∈ E and xk j < Nk then pi ≤ pk
ALGORITHM 3: Algorithm to nd REFP outcomes.
Input: Market and objective: (M, f )
Output: Allocation X and a pricing p
1. Run Algorithm 1 on input M to nd allocation X
2. Run Algorithm 2 on input (M,X , f ) to nd prices p
Output (X ,p)
e linear program shown in Algorithm 2 can be used to nd a set of restricted envy-free prices.
is program’s objective is an arbitrary linear function of an allocation X and prices p, and its
constraints are the linear conditions that characterize restricted envy-freeness.
eorem 3.6 implies the next corollary for the case of single-minded bidders.
Corollary 3.7. Given an allocation X , the problem of deciding the existence of a WE is solvable in
polynomial time, in single-minded CCMMs.
Proof. Consider the region formed by Individual Rationality, the Compact Condition, and the
following constraints: ∀j ∈ C : If |X j | = 0 then Pj (X j ) ≥ Vj (X j ). If this region is empty, then there
are no prices for which both winners and losers can be envy-free at the same time, and thus, a WE
does not exists. 
Note that this theorem does not apply to size-interchangeable bidders, because a loser might be
interested in an exponential number of bundles, and we would thus need an exponential number
of constraints to guarantee that the price of each exceeds the loser’s reward.
3.3 Finding Restricted Envy-Free Pricings (REFP)
We can now present our algorithm for nding REFPs. Algorithm 3 uses Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
as subroutines to rst nd an approximately welfare-maximizing allocation and then, using this
allocation, it solves for a set of supporting restricted envy-free prices.
We have thus succeeded in deriving a polynomial-time algorithm for nding a REFP, assuming a
linear objective. In the remainder of this paper, we focus our aention on revenue maximization in
size-interchangeable CCMMs, extending Algorithm 3 to form the heart of a heuristic that searches
for revenue-maximizing REFPs. While maximizing seller revenue is one fundamental economic
objective, we note that Algorithm 3 is exible enough to allow for dierent objectives, and thus
may be applicable in a wider variety of seings.
4 REVENUE MAXIMIZING EQUILIBRIA
We start by dening what revenue-maximization means for dierent solution concepts, and we
review algorithms found in the literature to compute these solutions in the special case of unit-
demand bidders. We then present our heuristic for nding revenue-maximizing REFPs in size-
interchangeable CCMMs.
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4.1 Problem Definitions
Denition 4.1. e revenue-maximizing WE problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenue-
maximizing WE.
Gul and Stachei [1999] presented the following VCG-inspired [Vickrey, 1961] polynomial-
time algorithm that solves the revenue-maximizing WE problem in unit-demand CCMMs. Let
V ∈ Rn+ × Rm+ be the valuation matrix of a market with n goods andm unit-demand bidders where
entry Vi j denotes bidder j’s valuation for good i . Let pi denote a maximum-weight matching of V ,
and let w (V ) denote the weight of pi . Let V −i denote the same valuation matrix, but with good i
removed. For each good i , set pi = w (V ) −w (V −i ). We call this algorithm, which returns outcome
(pi ,p), MaxWE.
Since a WE requires unallocated goods to be priced at 0, and at the same time ensures that all
bidders are envy-free, the seller revenue corresponding to a WE may be constrained to be very low.
Example 4.2. (Welfare-Revenue Tradeo) Consider the market in Figure (A) and the two dierent
outcomes in Figures (B) and (C).
goods bidders
u11
u11
c1 1,$100
c2 1,$1
prices
1
1
u1pB1
u2pB2
c1
c2
prices
1u1pC1
u2pC2
c1
c2
(A) (B) Welfare-Maximizing (C) Revenue-Maximizing
Outcome (B)’s allocation is welfare maximizing. To support a WE we must have 0 ≤ pB2 ≤ 1;
otherwise c2 would not be envy-free. Moreover, pB1 ≤ pB2 ; otherwise c1 would have preferred a copy
of u2. So prices can only be as high as pB1 = pB2 = 1, yielding revenue of 2.
Outcome (C)’s allocation is not welfare maximizing. However, in this case, an EFP (and hence,
a REFP) can be supported by higher prices than those in (B). In particular, pC2 ≥ 1; otherwise c2
would have preferred a copy of u2. Again pC1 ≤ pC2 for the same reasons as in (B). Prices could be as
high as pC1 = pC2 = 100, yielding revenue of 100.
e previous example motivates the introduction of reserve prices as a way to increase revenue
while maintaining envy-freeness among bidders. For example, we could set a reserve price of $2
for u2. Doing so would increase revenue from a maximum possible of $2 (with no reserve price) to
$100. But the use of reserve prices eectively throws some bidders out of the market; thus welfare
is sacriced, because any value these bidders could have potentially brought to the market is lost.
Motivated by this observation and building on Myerson’s [1981] intuition that reserve prices can
boost revenue, Guruswami et al. [2005] generalized the denition of WE so that unallocated goods
are priced at some, possibly non-zero, reserve price r ∈ R+, and dened the problem of searching
among these equilibria for one that maximizes revenue.
Denition 4.3. (Walrasian Equilibrium with reserve r ). A feasible outcome (X ,p) is a Walrasian
Equilibrium with reserve r (WEr) if it is a WE with prices at least r , including unallocated goods,
which must be priced at exactly r .
Denition 4.4. e revenue-maximizing WEr problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenue-
maximizing WEr.
Note that an EFP is agnostic as to the price of unallocated goods and thus, it is a generalization
of a WEr. e general revenue-maximizng EFP problem is dened as follow.
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ALGORITHM 4: Revenue-maximizing heuristic for size-interchangeable CCMMs.
Input: Market M and solution concept S
Output: A pricing p and an allocation X
1. Find an initial allocation X .
2. For all xi j > 0:
2.1 Set a reserve price r as a function of xi j and M .
2.2 Find (X ,p) for concept S using reserve r .
Output a pair (X ,p) with maximal seller revenue.
Denition 4.5. e revenue-maximizing EFP problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenue-
maximizing EFP.
Analogously, we dene a revenue-maximizing REFP.
Denition 4.6. e revenue-maximizing REFP problem: Given a CCMM, nd a revenue-
maximizing REFP.
Schematically, these solutions concepts obey the following containment relationship: WE ⊆WEr
⊆ EFP ⊆ REFP. us, any algorithm used to nd a revenue-maximizing WEr could be used to nd
an EFP, or even a REFP.
Next, we describe a revenue-maximizing strategy for any of these solution concepts, and explain
how this strategy was used in the case of unit-demand bidders to nd an approximately revenue-
maximizing EFP (by leveraging an algorithm that nds a WEr for a given reserve price).
4.2 Computing Revenue-Maximizing REFP
Algorithm 4 is a high-level strategy for searching among dierent equilibria for one that is revenue-
maximizing. e algorithm searches over dierent allocations X , computing revenue-maximizing
prices p for each, and then outputs a pair (X ,p) among those seen with maximal seller revenue.
e interesting choice, which governs the algorithm’s success, is the subspace of allocations
that it searches. In Algorithm 4, this space is determined based on some initial allocation, which
in turn determines a set of reserve prices, each of which yields an alternative allocation. Note
that this strategy only makes sense for solution concepts that vary with reserve prices. We will
discuss instances of this strategy that search for revenue-maximizing WEr (and thus, approximate
revenue-maximinzg EFP) in the case of unit-demand bidders, and REFP in the case of single-minded
and size-interchangeable bidders.
Unit-demand, revenue-maximizing WEr. In the unit-demand case, Guruswami et al. [Guruswami
et al., 2005], showed that the following instance of Algorithm 4 nds a revenue-maximizing WEr
with revenue at least OPT/(2 lnm), where OPT is the revenue of a revenue-maximizing WEr. (Step
1.) Find a maximum weight matching X of V . (Step 2.) For each valuation r on the edges of X ,
compute a WEr as follows: for each good i augment the valuation matrix to include two dummy
bidders, each with reward r . Run MaxWE on the new valuation matrix to obtain a WE (pi ,p), based
on which a new matching pi ′ can be inferred by reallocating goods from dummy bidders to real
bidders. Calculate the revenue associated with (pi ′,p). We call this Algorithm MaxWErApprox.
Size-Interchangeable, revenue-maximizing REFP. Like the algorithm of Guruswami et al. [2005],
our approach to searching for a revenue-maximizing REFP in size-interchangeable CCMMs follows
the structure of Algorithm 4. at is, for various choices of r , corresponding to various allocations
X , we nd a REFP where goods are priced at least at r , and then we output a REFP which is
revenue-maximizing among all those considered. More specically, we rst nd an approximately
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welfare-maximizing allocation X (Step 1), and then for all xi j > 0, we nd a REFP with reserve
r = R j/xi j (Step 2.1).
To nd a REFP with reserve (Step 2.2), we use a generalization of Algorithm 2 that receives a
reserve price r as an additional input, and includes the additional set of constraints: ∀i ∈ U : pi ≥ r .
However, it could happen that an allocation is input in which a winner cannot aord its bundle at
the given reserve price, rendering Algorithm 2 infeasible. In this case, we say that “the allocation
does not respect the reserve price”. To overcome this problem, we use the following straightforward
generalization of Algorithm 1 to produce an allocation that respects the reserve price, r :
Given input market M , construct new market M ′ by removing any bidder j such
that R j − rIj < 0, and seing the reward of the remaining bidders to be R j − rIj .
Now run Algorithm 1 on input M ′ to obtain an allocation X ′, which we li up to
create an allocation, X r , in the original market M that respects reserve prices.
In sum, our precise heuristic uses the aforementioned generalizations of Algorithms 1 and 2 in
Steps 1 and 2.2, respectively, to search over REFPs within Algorithm 4.
We have thus succeeded in dening a heuristic that searches for a revenue-maximizing REFP.
In the remainder of this paper, we investigate the quality of this heuristic; rst, theoretically, in
the special case of singleton markets; and then, in simulation experiments in more general market
seings.
5 THEORETICAL RESULTS IN TWO SPECIAL CASES OF CCMMS
Before presenting our experimental results on size-interchangeable CCMMs in general, we dene
singleton CCMMs, a special case of unit-demand CCMMs, and prove that our heuristic (Algorithm 3)
nds “true” envy-free prices in this special case; in other words, it nds WEr. In this way, we
illustrate that this algorithm works from rst principles, generalizing from a special case of unit-
demand to the more complicated cases of single-minded and size-interchangeable CCMMs.
We also present natural heuristic for single-minded CCMMs which falls out of our approach
of rst solving for an allocation, and then nding prices, in polynomial time, which support that
allocation and are as close to envy-free as possible.
5.1 Singleton CCMMs
Denition 5.1. (SingletonCCMM) We call a market a singleton CCMM if it is a CCMM in which
each bidder demands exactly one good, i.e., ∀j : Ij = 1.
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 2, when optimizing for seller-revenue, produces (unrestricted) envy-free
prices p on input (M,X , f , r ), whereM is a singleton CCMM andX is a welfare-maximizing allocation
that respects reserve price r .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume there is exactly one copy of each good in the
market: if the supply of a type of good i is Ni > 1, then we can replace this good by Ni identical
copies of i .
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists bidder j who is not envy-free. en, there exists
a bundle Yj , X j such that Vj (Yj ) − pj (Yj ) > Vj (X j ) − pj (X j ) (*). Note that |Yj | must equal 1, for
|Yj | = 0 implies Vj (Yj ) = pj (Yj ) = 0, but then 0 > Vj (X j ) − pj (X j ) by (*), which violates Individual
Rationality.
Since X is a matching, we have that either |X j | = 0 or |X j | = 1.
Case (i) If |X j | = 1, then then there is exactly one good k such that xk j = 1. Since Yj , X j ,
bundle Yj must consist of a good l , k to j. Also, since |Yj | = 1, Vj (Yj ) = R j . Now, by (*),
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R j − pl > R j − pk =⇒ pl < pk . But, since X j exhausts market k , by the Compact Condition,
pk ≤ pl , a contradiction.
Case (ii) If |X j | = 0, since |Yj | = 1, bidder j would have preferred to have been allocated a copy
of some good l . From (*), R j > pl . But then p is not optimal. We can construct another feasible
solution p ′, identical to p, except that we set p ′l = R j for all goods l
′ in the transitive closure of j,
provided Individual Rationality is not violated, i.e., that the bidder j ′ allocated any such good l ′ has
reward R j′ > p ′l . Note that any such good l
′ must have been allocated to another bidder j ′ such
that R j′ ≥ R j ; otherwise, X was not optimal.
If the original solution satises the Compact Condition, then increasing the price of goods l ′
preserves this condition. A bidder not allocated any l ′ is indierent to an increased price, since the
Compact Condition already guarantees it received a cheaper price. A bidder allocated a good l ′ is
in the transitive closure of j , and thus, this bidder either had the price of its assigned good changed
to R j , in which case it gets a cheaper good, or its price remains the same. erefore, we have a new
feasible solution p ′ with more seller revenue than the optimal, a contradiction.
In both cases, we contradict our assumptions, and thus, there exists no such j. 
Corollary 5.3. Algorithm 2, when optimizing for seller-revenue and augmented with the market
clearance condition, ∀i ∈ U : if ∑j xi j = 0 then pi = r , produces a WEr on input (M,X , f , r ), where
M is a singleton CCMM and X is a welfare-maximizing allocation that respects reserve price r .
Proof. We need only show that unallocated bidders do not have envy. Consider an unallocated
good i . By the market clearance condition, pi = 0. All bidders j connected to i must have been
allocated under X ; otherwise, X was not optimal. Now, let k be the good allocated to bidder j. By
the Compact Condition pk ≤ pi . erefore, j is envy-free. 
ese results imply that, specically for single-valued unit-demand bidders, given a welfare-
maximizing allocation (which can be computed in polynomial-time in this case [Kuhn, 1955]), the
Individual Rationality, the Compact Condition, and Market Clearance completely characterize WE.
is amounts to a complete characterization of WE via linear constraints in this special case.
5.2 Revenue Maximizing REFPs in Single-Minded CCMMs
e following theorem uncovers a relationship between a revenue-maximizing REFP and a welfare-
maximizing allocation in the case of single-minded bidders. is theorem gives rise to an approxi-
mation algorithm for revenue-maximizing REFP in this special case.
Theorem 5.4. In the case of single-minded bidders, the problem of nding a revenue-maximizing
REFP reduces to the problem of nding a welfare-maximizing allocation.
Proof. Consider a single-minded CCMM with welfare-maximizing allocation X . We construct
a pricing p as follow: ∀j ∈W , chose an arbitrary good demanded by j , and set pi = R j . Set all other
prices to zero. Note that the outcome (X ,p) is a REFP, by construction. We argue by contradiction
that this outcome maximizes revenue.
First note that p is maximal for X , since incrementing any price would violate individual
rationality for the corresponding bidder. So if there is an allocation with more revenue, it must
allocate to at least one bidder j ′ who is not allocated in X . But this implies that X was not
welfare-maximizing, a contradiction.
Converesly, suppose that (X ,p) is a revenue-maximizing REFP. Since winners must be individu-
ally rational, this outcome charges at most R j to any j ∈W . But any revenue-maximizing outcome
must charge each bidder its entire value R j , otherwise we could have increased revenue. us, each
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winner in outcome (X ,p) must pay her entire valuation. Since (X ,p) is revenue-maximizing, the
set of winners in X must maximize welfare. 
We now present Algorithm 5, an algorithm to nd approximate revenue-maximizing REFP
outcomes in the case of single-minded bidders. Our algorithm uses approximation Algorithm 1
to nd a nearly welfare-maximizing allocation, and then imposes further constraints that make
losers as envy-free as possible. (Winners are already envy-free, because they are single-minded, so
by denition, they wouldn’t prefer another bundle.) Since the welfare- and revenue-maximizing
problems are equivalent, our algorithm exhibits the same approximation ratio showed by [Lehmann
et al., 2002] for single-minded bidders, namely
√
m.
ALGORITHM 5: Approximate revenue-maximizing REFP outcomes in single-minded CCMMs.
Input: Market M with single-minded bidders
Output: Allocation X and a pricing p
1. Run Algorithm 1 on input M to nd allocation X
2. Given X , solve the following linear program
maximize ∑i, j xi jpi −∑j<W α j
subject to (1) ∀j <W : ∑i :(i, j )∈E pi ≥ Rj − α j
(2) ∀j ∈W : Pj (X j ) ≤ Vj (X j )
(3) ∀j <W : α j ≥ 0
Output (X ,p)
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe experimental results obtained for two dierent forms of CCMMs: the
rst is entirely synthetic, while the second relies on actual statistical data on web usage.
Algorithms were coded in Java, using CPLEX for the mathematical programs. Experiments were
run on a grid of Intel Xeon machines, with 2.8 Clock CPU, and at most 8GB of RAM. Note that all code
used to obtain experimental results is available at hps://github.com/eareyan/envy-free-prices.
6.1 Experimental setup
Algorithms. Algorithms’ names are abbreviated as follows: MaxWErApprox refers to Gu-
ruswami et. al’s algorithm (see section 4). SingleMindedApprox refers to Huang’s et al.’s approx-
imation algorithm for the single-minded case (see Appendix for details). UnlimitedSupply refers
to both Guruswami et. al’s algorithm, assuming single-minded bidders and unlimited supply, and
to our generalization for size-interchangeable bidders (see Appendix for details). SMLP refers to
Algorithm 5, our approximation algorithm for single-minded bidders. LP refers to our revenue-
maximizing REFP heuristic (Algorithm 4) for size-interchangeable CCMMs. All LP algorithms are
qualied by the objective of the allocation: LP Optimal Utilitarian and LP Optimal Egalitarian
indicates whether a welfare-maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) or an optimal egalitarian allocation is
given as input; likewise for, LP Greedy Utilitarian and LP Greedy Egalitarian. In our imple-
mentations, the greedy approximation algorithms order goods in descending order of remaining
supply. We also experimented with ordering goods in ascending order of remaining supply, but
saw no qualitative dierences in the results.
Metrics. Given outcome (X ,p), revenue is dened as ρ = ∑j ∑i xi jpi , and welfare as υ =∑
j R jyj , where yj = 1 in case bidder j is a winner under X and 0 otherwise. Let OPTυ be the
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value of a welfare-maximizing allocation.1 Since we assume bidders are individually rational, seller
revenue cannot exceed OPTυ . We thus report metrics of eciency υ/OPTυ , and seller revenue
ρ/OPTυ . We also report metrics based on violations of the (unrestricted) envy-freeness and market
clearing conditions. We dene an envy-free violation (EF) as the ratio between the number of
bidders that are not envy-free, and the total number of bidders in the market. We dene envy-free
loss (EF Loss) as the ratio of lost utility to total utility among losers, i.e., ∑j<W (R j − P∗j )/∑j<W R j ,
where P∗j is the price of j’s cheapest bundle. We dene a market clearance violation (MC) as
the ratio between the number of good types that are completely unallocated, but whose price
nevertheless is greater than zero, and the total number of goods in the market. Finally, we dene
market-clearance loss (MC Loss) as the ratio of the total price of MC violating goods to the total
price of goods, i.e. ∑i |pi>0∧∑j xi j=0 pi/∑i pi . All metrics are reported over two types of markets:
Random-k-Market(n,m,p,k ) and AdXMarket(m,p).
Random-k-Market(n,m,p,k ). Let S = ∑i Ni be the total supply of M , and let D = ∑j Ij be the
total demand of M . e supply-to-demand ratio S/D, is a measure of how over or under demanded a
market is. A market is over demanded if S/D < 1 and under demanded if S/D > 1. A random market
drawn from Random-k-Market(n,m,p,k ) over CCMM has n goods andm bidders. e parameter p
is the probability that an edge (i, j ) is present in E, and thus, the expected number of edges is pnm.
In the case of size-interchangeable bidders, both Ni and Ij are integers between 1 and 10, drawn
independently, and uniformly at random, such that the supply-to-demand ratio is k . In the case of
single-minded bidders, Ni = 1, for all i . In the case of singleton bidders, Ij = 1, for all j. Finally,
each bidder’s reward R j is drawn independently and uniformly at random from the range [1,10].
We generate Random-k-Market(n,m,p,k ) markets with n,m = 1, . . . , 20, p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, and
k = 0.25, 0.33, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4. For each combination, we report the average values of the metrics over
100 independent trials. e time scale is in milliseconds.
AdXMarket(m,p). In the Trading Agent Competition Ad Exchange game [Schain and Mansour,
2013] (TAC AdX), agents bid on behalf of campaigns, each of which requires a xed number of
impressions from targeted users to obtain a reward. A targeted user is an Internet user classied
as either female or male, of age young or old, with low or high income, and is characterized by
device (either mobile or PC).2 When a user visits a website, it produces one or more impression
opportunities. As there are six active websites, there are a total of 6 · 24 = 96 dierent types of
impression opportunities.
Following the TAC AdX specication, we construct a distribution we call AdXMarket(m,p). A
random market drawn from this distribution has m bidders and 96 goods. e supply of each
good is determined by generating 10,000 targeted users according to a distribution constructed
from available statistical data from web information services such as www.alexa.com (see Table 2
in [Schain and Mansour, 2013]), and then simulating these users visiting a website according to a
distribution also constructed from available statistical data (see Table 3 in [Schain and Mansour,
2013])). Aer its rst visit, each targeted user continues visiting websites with probability p, up to
a maximum of 6 visits. Each campaign j requires a random number of targeted users Ij , and has
a corresponding reward R j = Ij . We generate AdXMarket (m,p) markets withm = 1, . . . , 20 and
p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0. For each combination, we report the average values of the metrics over 100
independent trials. e time scale is in milliseconds.
1We present an ILP for a welfare-maximizing allocation for size-interchangeable CCMMs in the appendix.
2We ignore the game’s adtypes (video or text), since both are equally likely.
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6.2 Results
We report on experiments with three types of valuations: single-minded, singleton, and size-
interchangeable CCMMs. ese results are summarized in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, respectively.
In all cases, we draw markets from the Random-k-Market(n,m,p,k ) distribution. Additionally, for
size-interchangeable CCMMs, we draw markets from the AdXMarket(m,p) distribution. ese
results are summarized in Table 4. In what follows, we rst make some general remarks, and then
we identify some of the highlights of our extensive experiments.
Overview. Our experimental results show that, in general, our algorithms performs well across
the dierent markets on the metrics of revenue, eciency, and time, with very few violations of
the EF and MC conditions. Although our heuristic searches only REFPs, we nevertheless obtain
outcomes that are close to EFPs, even when we seed our heuristic with a welfare-maximizing
allocation, rather than an egalitarian one. In other words, our two step approach of rst xing an
allocation, and then making only winners envy-free, seems to be a reasonable way to nd nearly
EFP outcomes, in which losers are also envy-free.
Also of interest is the fact that only in size-interchangeable CCMMs do the egalitarian algorithms
achieve fewer EF violations than the utilitarian ones. e original intent of the egalitarian objective
was to increase the number of winners, so that solving for restricted envy-free prices where
only winners are envy-free, would yield fewer EF violations—fewer losers would mean fewer
opportunities to violate EF. However, egalitarian allocations end up allocating goods to bidders
with low rewards which, together with individual rationality, keeps prices low, which of course
yields low revenue, but also yields EF violations of greater magnitude, because those bidders with
envy have a lot of envy, given that the goods they were not allocated are necessarily cheap.
Single-minded bidders are interested in exactly one bundle (or any bundle that contains that
bundle). A single-minded valuation is an example of an AND valuation, which models complements.
In contrast, a singleton bidder is interesting in acquiring one good from one of multiple sources,
but is indierent about the precise source. is is an example of an OR valuation, which models
substitutes. A size-interchangeable bidder is a combination of these two where bidders are interested
in a bundle of certain size (AND), but are indierent among various sources (OR). Computationally,
ANDs appear easier, since they are more restrictive, so further limit the search space, whereas ORs
are more exible, and hence requires us to search through more options.
e color conventions used in the tables are as follow. Best results (excluding Optimal Utilitarian
and Optimal Egalitarian) are colored in red, and worst results (excluding Optimal Utilitarian and
Optimal Egalitarian) are colored in blue. e Score column reports a summary score for each
algorithm, which is dened as the sum of the absolute value between the algorithm’s performance
and the performance of the best algorithm in each dimension (Welfare, Revenue, EF, EF Loss, MC,
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Single-Minded, Overdemanded
Welfare Revenue EF EF Loss MC MC Loss Time Score
SingleMindedApprox 0.9654 0.9654 0.1147 0.5151 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2919
UnlimitedSupply 0.8290 0.8290 0.0000 0.0000 0.4078 0.4078 0.0007 0.7528
SMLP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.9834 0.9834 0.0014 0.0025 0.1114 0.2596 0.0000 0.0000
SMLP Greedy Egalitarian 0.6450 0.6450 0.0988 0.1219 0.1482 0.3197 0.0000 0.9940
SMLP Optimal Utilitarian 1.0000 1.0000 0.0009 0.0013 0.0820 0.1524 0.2632 0.0920
SMLP Optimal Egalitarian 0.6821 0.6821 0.1045 0.1276 0.1253 0.2877 0.1237 1.0000
Single-Minded, Underdemanded
SingleMindedApprox 0.9882 0.9882 0.0195 0.0757 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150
UnlimitedSupply 0.5496 0.5496 0.0000 0.0000 0.8206 0.8206 0.0002 1.0000
SMLP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.9977 0.9977 0.0000 0.0000 0.0227 0.0547 0.0000 0.0000
SMLP Greedy Egalitarian 0.8861 0.8861 0.0596 0.1162 0.0327 0.1300 0.0000 0.1969
SMLP Optimal Utilitarian 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0211 0.0511 0.0574 0.0193
SMLP Optimal Egalitarian 0.8981 0.8981 0.0599 0.1157 0.0288 0.1173 0.0349 0.1945
Table 1. Single-Minded Markets
MC Loss, and Time). e score is normalized to be in the range [0, 1], so that any algorithm with
score of 0 is a top performer (marked with a ?). According to this metric, these algorithms strike
the best balance across all dimensions.
Next, we present and analyze results for each type of market studied in this paper.
Single-Minded Valuations. Figure 1 illustrates results for a xed number of goods (10), as we
vary the number of bidders (x-axis), in the case of overdemanded markets with single-minded
bidders. ese plots show a comparison between two baseline algorithms, SingleMindedApprox
and UnlimitedSupply, and our SMLP heuristics. Recall that in this case, welfare and revenue are
the same (see eorem 5.4); thus, we present both results in one plot.
ese results depict a general trend: our utilitarian heuristics (both optimal and greedy) outper-
form the baselines in terms of welfare/revenue. SingleMindedApprox provably commits no MC
violations, but commits the most EF violations. UnlimitedSupply’s EF violations are provably
bounded, but it commits the most MC violations. Unsurprisingly, the egalitarian heuristics do not
obtain nearly the welfare/revenue as well as their utilitarian counterparts in these markets; and, as
already noted, their EF violations are more substantial. e EF violations of our utilitarian heuristics
are on par with those of UnlimitedSupply, and they commit relatively few MC violations as well.
Table 1 presents additional, detailed results for single-minded markets. Algorithm Single-
MindedApprox has high welfare and revenue, but very high EF and EF Loss. is outcome is
not surprising, as this algorithm was designed to price goods so that winners are EF, but does
not simultaneously price them so that losers have as lile envy as possible. is algorithm, by
denition, has no MC or MC Loss, which further contributes to high EF and EF Loss. Algorithm
Unlimited Supply has low welfare and revenue, but also low EF and EF Loss. is algorithm does
a beer job pricing goods so that losers are closer to satisfying the EF condition. However, by
denition, this algorithm violates the MC condition, since all goods are priced equally irrespective
of their allocation. A complete description of both of these algorithms is given in the Appendix.
In contrast, our SMLPs, aer maximizing welfare, do a much beer job at balancing the competing
objectives, accruing high welfare/revenue with relatively few violations of any kind. Indeed, LP
Greedy Utilitarian is the top performer according to our summary score.
Singleton Markets. Table 2 presents detailed results for singleton markets. In the case of overde-
manded markets, MaxWErApprox is the clear winner, as it dominates in all measured dimensions.
Interestingly, our LP Greedy Egalitarian is the worst performer under all metrics (except time).
As discussed above, the reason why the egalitarian allocation fails to produce good results is that
this allocation awards goods to bidders irrespective of their reward and thus, ends up allocating to
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Singleton, Overdemanded
Welfare Revenue EF EF Loss MC MC Loss Time Score
MaxWErApprox? 0.9511 0.8287 0.0000 0.0000 0.1066 0.1044 0.0000 0.0000
LP Greedy Utilitarian 0.9198 0.8193 0.0094 0.0111 0.1282 0.1312 0.0062 0.3109
LP Greedy Egalitarian 0.8776 0.7619 0.0472 0.0687 0.1552 0.1498 0.0059 0.9560
LP Optimal Utilitarian 0.9461 0.8398 0.0000 0.0000 0.1006 0.1026 0.0945 0.2164
LP Optimal Egalitarian 0.9060 0.7914 0.0387 0.0548 0.1262 0.1230 0.1584 1.0000
Singleton, Underdemanded
MaxWErApprox 0.8742 0.7302 0.0000 0.0000 0.5281 0.5220 0.0000 0.5929
LP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.8806 0.7755 0.0013 0.0015 0.4703 0.4907 0.0043 0.0000
LP Greedy Egalitarian 0.8728 0.7620 0.0046 0.0062 0.4861 0.4978 0.0060 0.2390
LP Optimal Utilitarian 0.8939 0.7950 0.0000 0.0000 0.4602 0.4832 0.2646 0.9184
LP Optimal Egalitarian 0.8925 0.7934 0.0020 0.0019 0.4645 0.4860 0.2690 1.0000
Table 2. Singleton Markets
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Fig. 2. Size-Interchangeable, Under Demanded, 5 goods.
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bidders with low reward, which results in a very restrictive upper bound on prices. is outcome is
clearly seen in our results—in particular, in the relatively high EF and EF Loss of the egalitarian
objective compared to the others—in both over- and under-demanded markets. Unlike in the case
of singleton overdemanded markets, for underdemanded markets there was no clear winner or
loser; however, LP Greedy Utilitarian is the top performer using our summary score.
Size-Interchangeable Valuations. Figure 2 illustrates results on Random-k-Market(n,m,p,k ) for a
xed number of goods (5), as we vary the number of bidders (x-axis), in the case of underdemanded
markets with size-interchangeable bidders. ese plots compare the baseline algorithm Unlimit-
edSupply to our various LP heuristics. In these markets, irrespective of the allocation algorithm
used, our algorithms outperform the baseline in terms of welfare, revenue, and MC violations. In
the case of EF, all algorithms perform within 1.5% of each other, but the baseline outperforms one
of the greedy heuristics. is performance, however, comes at a cost in all other dimensions.
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Size-Interchangeable, Overdemanded
Welfare Revenue EF EF Loss MC MC Loss Time Score
UnlimitedSupply 0.8467 0.6160 0.0046 0.0063 0.2904 0.2904 0.0037 0.7618
LP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.8563 0.6533 0.0175 0.0304 0.1702 0.1595 0.0098 0.0000
LP Greedy Egalitarian 0.8480 0.6474 0.0093 0.0152 0.1852 0.1726 0.0093 0.0550
LP Optimal Utilitarian 0.8730 0.6703 0.0110 0.0202 0.1639 0.1540 0.4066 1.0000
LP Optimal Egalitarian 0.8590 0.6614 0.0086 0.0156 0.1790 0.1663 0.3073 0.8326
Size-Interchangeable, Underdemanded
UnlimitedSupply 0.8683 0.7141 0.0045 0.0047 0.4355 0.4355 0.0007 1.0000
LP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.8943 0.7628 0.0297 0.0442 0.1854 0.1909 0.0057 0.0000
LP Greedy Egalitarian 0.8745 0.7408 0.0259 0.0341 0.2054 0.2086 0.0044 0.1287
LP Optimal Utilitarian 0.9100 0.7759 0.0211 0.0301 0.2517 0.2596 0.2004 0.5567
LP Optimal Egalitarian 0.8891 0.7590 0.0192 0.0244 0.2737 0.2791 0.1358 0.5709
Table 3. Size-Interchangeable Markets
Table 3 presents additional, detailed results for size-interchangeable markets. Our results show a
symmetric relationship between under- and over-demanded markets where UnlimitedSupply and
our LP Greedy Utilitarian share both the best and worst metrics. Note that UnlimitedSupply
has the worst welfare, revenue, MC and MC Loss but achieves the best results in terms of EF and
EF Loss, and is faster. In contrast, LP Greedy Utilitarian has the best welfare, revenue, MC and
MC Loss but achieves the worst results in terms of EF and EF Loss. at said, measured by our
summary score, LP Greedy Utilitarian is the top performer, and UnlimitedSupply is the boom
performer in underdemanded markets, and a very distant third, in overdemanded markets.
Finally, Table 4 presents detailed results for TAC markets. Not suprisingly, these results are
similar to the size-interchangeable markets’ results, with the primary dierence being that the
algorithm with the worst performance in terms of welfare is LP Greedy Egalitarian, rather than
UnlimitedSupply. LP Greedy Utilitarian remains the top performer (and improves from the
worst to the best algorithm as measured by time).
TAC, Overdemanded
Welfare Revenue EF EF Loss MC MC Loss Time Score
UnlimitedSupply 0.8544 0.7580 0.0199 0.0595 0.5507 0.5507 0.0908 0.3146
LP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.9325 0.9289 0.0803 0.4915 0.0439 0.1965 0.0330 0.0000
LP Greedy Egalitarian 0.7951 0.7600 0.0679 0.3751 0.1731 0.2125 0.0599 0.1629
LP Optimal Utilitarian 0.9992 0.9592 0.0507 0.2970 0.1604 0.3524 1.4110 0.6193
LP Optimal Egalitarian 0.8738 0.8395 0.0518 0.2708 0.3200 0.4611 1.7400 1.0000
TAC, Underdemanded
UnlimitedSupply 0.8762 0.8171 0.0089 0.0218 0.6896 0.6896 0.0204 0.8336
LP Greedy Utilitarian? 0.9250 0.9231 0.0604 0.3134 0.0327 0.1904 0.0176 0.0000
LP Greedy Egalitarian 0.8638 0.8368 0.0466 0.2368 0.0994 0.1890 0.0241 0.1107
LP Optimal Utilitarian 0.9919 0.9582 0.0246 0.1166 0.1515 0.4406 0.8760 0.7668
LP Optimal Egalitarian 0.9049 0.8789 0.0358 0.1717 0.2180 0.5019 0.7871 1.0000
Table 4. TAC Markets
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A Walrasian equilibrium is a fundamental market outcome where market participants are maximally
happy and the market eciently allocates resources. However, a WE need not exist in general
CCMMs, even for relatively straightforward forms of bidders’ valuations function (e.g., single-
minded bidders). In this paper, we take as our starting point a proposed relaxation of WE known
as envy-free pricing, which always exists. We relax this solution concept even further by requiring
only that winners are envy-free. We call this concept restricted envy-free pricing, and develop a
computational framework to compute REFP outcomes for single-minded and size-interchangeable
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bidders. In our framework, we rst solve for an allocation, and then for supporting prices that
guarantees that winners are envy-free. is two-step approach might fail for EFP, but always exists
for REFP. We generalize an existing greedy allocation algorithm to the case of size-interchangeable
bidders, and use this algorithm as the rst step in our framework.
We next tackle the problem of nding a revenue-maximizing REFP among all possible outcomes.
e methods develop in the rst part of the paper form the heart of a general heuristic to nd a
revenue-maximizing REFP in size-interchangeable CCMMs, as well as an approximation algorithm
specically developed for single-minded CCMMs. We prove that our general heuristic which
searches only for REFP actually nds WEr in singleton markets—so that all bidders, not just
winners, are envy-free—thereby arguing that our relaxation is not only computationally feasible,
but further, a natural generalization of WEr.
We evaluate the performance of our algorithms experimentally, on both a synthetic distribution
and one obtained from real-world web-usage data. ey perform well on metrics of welfare, revenue,
EF, and MC violations, compared to baseline algorithms from the literature. Our algorithms perform
best when seeded with an approximately welfare-maximizing allocation, and produce results very
close to true EFP despite the fact that in our relaxation we only guarantee that winners (not losers)
are envy-free. In fact, our approximately welfare-maximizing algorithm is consistently ranked as
the top performer algorithm, as measured by a summary score that balances the performance of
algorithms across all evaluated dimensions.
is paper introduces a novel relaxation of WE, an algorithm to compute this outcome, and a
heuristic to search among these outcomes for one that maximizes revenue. All of this machinery
was designed to tackle this problem for markets with size-interchangeable bidders. Further study
of these valuations, for example in the mechanism design seing, where valuations are unknown,
remains completely open.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Note that this proof follows the corresponding proof for single-minded bidders [Lehmann et al.,
2002]. Given a market M , let I ∗ = maxj ∈C Ij ,W be the set of winners of the greedy allocation, and
OPT be the set of winner of an optimal allocation. Recall thatm is the number of bidders.
We want to show that the value of the greedy allocation is withinm
√
I ∗ of the value of an optimal
allocation, i.e.,m
√
I ∗
∑
j ∈W
R j ≥ ∑
j ∈OPT
R j
Start by dening, for each j ∈W , the set OPTj = {k ∈ OPT ,k ≥ j | k <W } of elements in OPT
that are not part of the greedy allocation because j is (including j). Alternatively, we can think of
the set OPTj as containing all elements k ∈ OPT that are “blocked” by j.
Observation: Note that OPT ⊆ ∪j ∈WOPTj . Let x ∈ OPT . We must have that either x ∈ W
or not. In case x ∈ W , then x ∈ OPTx since each OPTj contains j and thus, x ∈ W . Otherwise,
if x < W , then x is part of an optimal allocation but not of the greedy allocation and thus, by
denition, there exists some j ′ such that x ∈ OPTj′ .
If we can show that the following bound holds ∑
j′∈OPTj
R j′ ≤ m
√
I ∗R j , then by the previous
observation we would have that∑
j′∈OPTj
R j′ ≤ m
√
I ∗R j =⇒ ∑
j ∈W
∑
j′∈OPTj
R j′ ≤ ∑
j ∈W
m
√
I ∗R j adding over all j ∈W
=⇒ ∑
j ∈OPT
R j ≤ m
√
I ∗
∑
j ∈W
R j by previous observation
To show the bound, rst note that every j ′ ∈ OPTj appears aer j in the greedy ordering
R j√
Ij
≥ R j′√
Ij′
=⇒ R j′ ≤ R j√
Ij
√
Ij′
Summing over j ′ ∈ OPTj we get:∑
j′∈OPTj
R j′ ≤
∑
j′∈OPTj
R j√
Ij
√
Ij′ =
R j√
Ij
∑
j′∈OPTj
√
Ij′
We can bound ∑
j′∈OPTj
√
Ij′ by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
∑
j′∈OPTj
√
Ij′ ≤
√ ∑
j′∈OPTj
12
√ ∑
j′∈OPTj
√
Ij′
2
=
√
|OPTj |
√ ∑
j′∈OPTj
Ij′
e worst case j blocks all bidders and thus, |OPTj | ≤ m.
Likewise, in the worst case, all blocked bidders demand I ∗, items and thus, ∑
j′∈OPTj
Ij′ ≤ mI ∗
Combining these two bounds we get:∑
j′∈OPTj
R j′ ≤ R j√
Ij
∑
j′∈OPTj
√
Ij′ ≤ R j√
Ij
√
|OPTj |
√ ∑
j′∈OPTj
Ij′
≤ R j√
Ij
√
m
√
mI ∗ ≤ m√I ∗R j
where the last equality follows because Ij ≥ 1. is completes the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.6
Given a market (U ,C,E, ~N ,~I , ~R) and a feasible allocation X , the following conditions are necessary
and sucient conditions for p to be restricted envy-free.
Individual Rationality: ∀j ∈ C : Pj (X j ) ≤ Vj (X j ).
Compact Condition: ∀i ∈ U , j ∈ C : If xi j > 0 then
∀k ∈ U : If (k, j ) ∈ E and xk j < Nk then pi ≤ pk .
We will prove directly that Individual Rationality and the Compact Condition are necessary
conditions for restricted envy-free prices. To prove suciency, we will use the following alternative
conditions:
Condition A: If 0 < xi j < Ni , 0 < xk j < Nk then pi = pk .
Condition B: If xi j = Ni , 0 < xk j < Nk , then pi ≤ pk .
Condition C: If xi j = 0 and 0 < xk j ≤ Nk , then pi ≥ pk .
We will rst prove that Compact Condition implies Conditions A, B and C. To conclude our
proof, we prove that Individual Rationality together with Conditions A, B and C are sucient
for restricted envy-free prices.
e Compact Condition means that in all goods where a bidder is allocated not nothing from
good i , and not everything from good k , then the price in i is less than or equal to the price in k .
Condition A means that if a bidder is allocated some of two goods (but not all and not none), then
the prices of those two goods must be the same. Condition B means that if a bidder is allocated all
copies of a good, then the price of that good is less than the price of other goods where the bidder
is allocated some (or none, by transitivity). Finally, Condition C means that if a bidder is allocated
some copies of a good, then the price of that good is less than the price of other goods where the
bidder is allocated none.
We now show that these are sucient and necessary conditions for restricted envy-free prices.
Necessity. Let X ∈ F . Suppose p is a restricted envy-free pricing. en, for every j such that
|X j | > 0 we have X j ∈ arg maxX ′∈B ( ~N |Xj | ) {Vj (X
′
j ) − Pj (X ′j )}. Individual Rationality follows
immediately from the fact that, for any j, 0 ∈ B ( ~N |X j | ). We prove the Compact Condition by
contradiction. Let i and j be such that xi j > 0 but suppose there exists k such that xk j < Nk and
pi > pk . In this case we can construct a feasible bundle Yj ∈ B ( ~N |X j | ) such that Vj (Yj ) − Pj (Yj ) >
Vj (X j ) − Pj (X j ) which would imply X j < arg maxX ′∈B ( ~N |Xj | ) {Vj (X
′
j ) − Pj (X ′j )}. Construct Yj as
follow: initially Yj = X j and then replace yk j = xk j + 1 and yi j = xi j − 1. In words, take one less
from xi j and replace it with one from xk j . Since xi j > 0 and xk j < Nk we have that Yj is a feasible
bundle. By construction |X j | = |Yj | and so Vj (Yj ) = Vj (X j ). Since pi > pk and bundle Yj uses
one more from k and one less from i compared to bundle X j , it follows that Pj (Yj ) < Pj (X j ) or
equivalently Vj (Yj ) − Pj (Yj ) > Vj (X j ) − Pj (X j ). 
We show that the Compact Condition implies Conditions A, B and C and thus, establish
that all conditions are necessary for restricted envy-free prices. Suppose the Compact Condition
is true. Let us prove each condition separately:
Condition A: Suppose (a) 0 < xi j < Ni and (b) 0 < xk j < Nk . Apply the compact condition in
two ways: (1) by (a), 0 < xi j and by (b), xk j < Nk , thus, compact condition implies pi ≤ pk . (2) by
(b), 0 < xk j and by (a), xi j < Ni , thus, compact condition implies pk ≤ pi . (1) and (2) imply that
pi = pk
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Condition B: Suppose (a) xi j = Ni and (b) 0 < xk j < Nk . Since Ni > 0 is a positive integer (a)
implies xi j > 0 which together with the compact condition and (b) implies pi ≤ pk
Condition C: Suppose (a) xi j = 0 and (b) 0 < xk j ≤ Nk . Since Ni > 0 is a positive integer (a)
implies xi j = 0 < Ni which together with the compact condition and (b) implies pk ≤ pi . erefore
all conditions are necessary.
Suiciency. It suces to show that Conditions A, B, C and Individual Rationality imply
restricted envy-free prices. Given X , suppose for a contradiction that p is a pricing that is not
restricted envy-free but that satises conditions Conditions A, B, C and Individual Rationality.
By denition there exists j such that |X j | > 0 but
X j < arg max
X ′∈B ( ~N |Xj | )
{Vj (X ′j ) − Pj (X ′j )}
Let Yj ∈ B ( ~N |X j | ) be such that Yj ∈ arg maxX ′∈B ( ~N |Xj | ) {Vj (X
′
j ) − Pj (X ′j )}. is means:
Vj (Yj ) − Pj (Yj ) > Vj (X j ) − Pj (X j ) (∗)
We must have |Yj | = |X j |, for otherwise |Yj | = 0 would imply Vj (Yj ) = Pj (Yj ) = 0, but by
Individual Rationality |X j | > 0 implies Pj (X j ) ≤ Vj (X j ), contradicting (*).
us, |Yj | = |X j |, which means Vj (Yj ) = Vj (X j ). Simplifying (∗) we get:
Pj (Yj ) < Pj (X j ) (∗∗)
We will now show that equation (∗∗) leads to a contradiction. First note that, by denition,
Pj (Yj ) ≥ 0 together with (∗∗) imply Pj (X j ) > 0. is means that there is some good i such that the
allocation xi j > 0 and pi > 0. Without loss of generality, let us consider the following cases:
(1) bundle Yj contains goods from at least one dierent good than X j . We know that xi j > 0.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that xk j = yk j , xi j > yi j and yl j > xl j = 0. Since both bundles
have the same number of goods, it follows that xi j = yi j+yl j . is implies that xi jpi = (yi j+yl j )pi =
yi jpi +yl jpi . By Condition C, 0 < pi ≤ pl , and thus xi jpi ≤ yi jpi +yl jpl . It follows that bundle Yj
is at least as expensive as X j , since Pj (X j ) = xi jpi + xk jpk ≤ yi jpi + yl jpl + yk jpk = Pj (Yj ). us,
Pj (X j ) ≤ Pj (Yj ), contradicting (**).
(2) bundle Yj contains a dierent number of copies from the same good in X j . Consider ϵ > 0. In
this case it must be that xi j < Ni since we cannot take from an exhausted good. If xk j < Nk , then
Condition A implies pi = pk , and thus Pj (X j ) = Pj (Yj ). If xk j = Nk , then Condition B implies
pk ≤ pi , and thus Pj (X j ) ≤ Pj (Yj ).
In either case, bundle Yj is at least as expensive as X j
erefore, we conclude that in all cases bundleYj is at least as expensive asX j , i.e., Pj (Yj ) ≥ Pj (X j ),
contradicting (∗∗). 
Note that the Compact Condition is not sucient nor necessary for restricted envy-free in
case Vj is not a single step function. Consider a market with 2 goods, both oered in 1 copy, and 1
bidder, demanding one copy from either good. Suppose the bidder values geing 1 copy of good 1
in 1000 and geing 1 of good 2 in 100. Pricing the rst good in 20 and the second in 10, the bidder
would want to get the more expensive one because since it maximize its utility. So, even though
the bidder consumed all copies of a good and not all of another good, the exhausted good is still
more expensive than the non-exhausted market.
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Mixed ILP to find optimal allocations
Given a market (U ,C,E, ~N ,~I , ~R), Algorithm 6 is a mixed ILP that can be used to nd an optimal
allocation. To show this, we prove claims (i) and (ii).
ALGORITHM 6: Mixed ILP Optimal Allocation
Input: Market M = (U ,C,E, ~N ,~I , ~R)
Output: An optimal allocation X
maximize
m∑
j=1
Rjyj
subject to (1) ∀i : ∑mj=1 xi j ≤ Ni
(2) ∀i, j : If(i, j ) < E then xi j = 0
(3) ∀j : yj ≤ 1Ij
∑n
i=1 xi j ≤ yj
(4) yj ∈ {0, 1}
(5) ∀i, j : xi j ∈ Z+
Claim (i): Constraints (1), (2) and (5) imply that a solution to the Mixed-ILP is a feasible allocation.
Proof. Constraint (1) guarantees that allocation from a given good does not exceed its supply.
Constraint (2) guarantees that if i is not connected to j, then allocation from i to j is exactly zero.
Constraint (5) guarantees that allocation is given in positive integer values. 
Claim (ii): Constraints (3) and (4) imply that a bidder aains reward R j if and only if it is
completely fullled, and together with constraint (5), imply that if yj = 0 then xi j = 0 for all i .
Proof. Note that satisfying constraint (3) implies that yj Ij ≤ ∑ni=1 xi j and∑ni=1 xi j ≤ yj Ij . ese
two inequalities, together with constraint (4), imply that if yj = 1 then
∑n
i=1 xi j = Ij , and if yj = 0
then ∑ni=1 xi j = 0 since Ij > 0. Finally, if ∑ni=1 xi j = 0 then constraint (5) implies that xi j = 0 for all
i . is means that yj indicates whether j should be fullled. 
Together, Claims (i) and (ii) imply that a solution found by the mixed ILP is a feasible allocation
where a bidder j is completely allocated a bundle of size exactly Ij only in case it is fullled, and an
empty bundle otherwise. e objective of the mixed ILP implies that the solution maximizes bidders’
rewards over all feasible allocations and thus, it is an optimal allocation. To obtain an allocation
that respects reserve price r , change the objective of the mixed ILP to ∑mj=1 (R j − rIj )yj , where
r ∈ R+ is the reserve price parameter. To obtain an egalitarian allocation, change the objective to∑m
j=1 yj .
Greedy WE approximation, single-minded
For the reader convenience, we present Huang’s et.al. single-minded WE approximation in our
language (Algorithm 7). is algorithm is guaranteed to have at leastm/δ envy-free bidders, where
δ = maxj Ij , i.e., a bound on the size of bidder’s demand sets. [Huang et al., 2005]
Unlimited Supply EFP Approximation, single-minded
For the reader convenience, we present Guruswami’s et.al. unlimited supply, single-minded EFP
approximation (Algorithm 8). In the single-minded case, this algorithm is a log(m) + log(n)
approximation, and this guarantee is retained for nding revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing in
the case of size-interchangeable bidders with unlimited supply.
We generalize this algorithm to our limited supply model by allocating bidders in the following
order: R1/I1 ≥ R2/I2 ≥ . . . ≥ Rm/Im , and allocating each bidder in turn, if possible. As in
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ALGORITHM 7: WE Approximation Algorithm, single-minded bidders
Input: Market M with single-minded bidders
Output: Allocation-pricing pair, (X ,p)
For all i, j set xi j = 0.
while At least one bidder’s bundle is available do
Let i be the good that aract the most bidders;
Let C = {j | (i, j ) ∈ E}. Select j ∈ C such and Rj ≥ R′j , for all j ′ ∈ C .
Allocated j its demanded bundle and set pi = Rj .
Remove all bidders whose demanded bundle intersects that of j.
ALGORITHM 8: Unlimited Supply EFP Approximation Algorithm, single-minded bidders
Input: Market M with single-minded bidders
Output: Allocation-pricing pair, (X ,p)
For all i, j set xi j = 0.
foreach j ∈ C do
Let pi = Rj/Ij , for all i ∈ U .
Allocate all bidders their demand bundle at price pi to obtain outcome (X ,p).
Output (X ,p) with maximal revenue.
Guruswami’s et.al.’s algorithm, we output the outcome with maximal seller revenue among those
seen.
